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Abstract Nanotechnology, as with many technolo-
gies before it, places a strain on existing legislation
and poses a challenge to all administrative agencies
tasked with regulating technology-based products. It
is easy to see how statutory schemes become
outdated, as our ability to understand and affect the
world progresses. In this article, we address the
regulatory problems that nanotechnology posses for
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) classifi-
cation structure for ‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices.’’ The last
major modification to these terms was in 1976, with
the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments.
There are serious practical differences for a classifi-
cation as a drug or device in terms of time to market
and research. Drugs are classified, primarily, as
acting by ‘‘chemical action.’’ We lay out some legal,
philosophic, and scientific tools that serve to provide
a useful, as well as legally and scientifically faithful,
distinction between drugs and devices for the purpose
of regulatory classification. These issues we raise are
worth the consideration of anyone who is interested
in the regulation of nano-products or other novel
technologies.
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Introduction
Nanotechnology, as with many technologies before it,
places a strain on existing legislation and poses a
challenge to all administrative agencies tasked with
regulating technology-based products. It is easy to
see how statutory schemes become outdated as our
ability to understand and affect the world progresses.
Developing legislation that will correctly anticipate
the technologies and scientific advances of the next
50 years is particularly challenging, and it is unlikely
that any piece of legislation could be adequately
predictive. Although statutes written many years ago
may no longer sufficiently encompass the current
state of scientific knowledge or advanced technology,
an agency’s statutory obligations and broader direc-
tives require the agency to regulate the use of such
technologies under existing schemes.1 This can result
in incorrect, inconsistent, or inefficient regulation.
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1 The ultimate resolution of how to incorporate new scientific
knowledge and new product types into statutory and regulatory
systems resides with Congress. Congress often takes many
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In this article, we address the regulatory problems
that nanotechnology poses for the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) classification system for
‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices.’’ The last major modification
to these terms was in 1976, with the enactment of the
Medical Device Amendments. Subsequent legisla-
tion, regulation, and court decisions have simply
refined the core definitional schema created by
Congress in 1976. As a result, there is a need,
assuming that the current legislative approach
remains in place, to clarify how nanotechnology-
based products should be classified.
Due to the extremely tiny size of nanoparticles and
materials and the novel properties that emerge at this
scale, there is very little difference, if any, between
the chemistry and physics that occur at the atomic
and subatomic level which might, under other
circumstances, be used to draw a distinction between
drugs and devices. Of course, these same challenges
to FDA’s current product definition system may also
exist for other regulatory systems such as the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) or various environ-
mental regulatory systems. We have chosen to focus
on FDA’s particular predicament for two reasons: (1)
the problem is easier to manage in with a narrower
focus and (2) the FDA has a substantial impact on the
U.S. public and industries. Roughly 20 cents of every
dollar spent by the U.S. consumer are spent on an
FDA-regulated product (FDA 2009). Moreover, con-
sumers and patients are dependent on many of these
products for their health, requiring an especially
careful classification system to properly balance the
risks and benefits of new products.
Once we have addressed the need for a proper
interpretation of the existing statutory scheme, we
will examine some philosophical problems raised by
nanotechnology given this scheme. The two primary
philosophical issues we will address are physicalism
and causality. Physicalism is the idea that, at the end
of the day, we are all just physical things. We, just as
all things, are made up of fundamental particles held
together by basic forces. If this is the case, then what
distinguishes ‘‘bigger’’ objects, such as molecules
(chemical objects) or even human beings (biological
objects), and physical objects? When we discovered
the physical mechanisms for thunder and lightning,
we were in a position to stop talking about Zeus’
powers to throw lightning; in the same way, if
molecules and humans have as their underlying
mechanisms, nothing more than basic forces and
fundamental particles, we may also stop talking about
chemical or biological objects. That is, if there is no
scientifically (or philosophically) sound distinction
between these sorts of objects, it is difficult to see
how there can be a distinction between drugs and
devices. Put yet another way, everything, including
traditional ‘‘drugs’’ can be explained by physical (i.e.,
non-chemical) concepts. If we follow physicalism to
its logical end, then traditional drugs are equally
devices.
Causation also raises some very interesting issues
about nanotechnology-based medical products. This
problem is a bit more technical, so we will not say
more about it here in the introduction. Resolving
these scientific and philosophic issues presents a
springboard for providing the basics of an algorithm
for properly classifying nanotechnology-based prod-
ucts into either ‘‘drug’’ or ‘‘device’’ regulatory
schemes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, under the current
regulatory schema, some nanotechnology-based
products are ‘‘drugs’’ and others are ‘‘devices.’’2
Our primary goal throughout the paper will be to
provide the tools for FDA regulators, industry, and
other interested stakeholders, operating under the
existing statutory framework, to deal with the current
(and future) assignment of nanotechnology-based
products into either the drug or device worlds in a
consistent, logical, and predictable manner that
satisfies the statutory language and purpose.
Legal scope and import of the drug-device
distinction
While the question of the interpretation of the
statutory scheme regarding nanotechnology-based
products has obvious philosophical import, it begins
Footnote 1 continued
years to act after major scientific changes or advances. The
concepts we set forth in this article are directed at the regula-
tory agencies, which must deal with outdated statutes. How-
ever, these concepts could also form the basis for
Congressional action to address the impact of new scientific
knowledge and new products.
2 For example, nanoparticle silver coatings on implants are
viewed as devices, while nanosphere-based drug delivery
systems are considered drugs.
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as a straightforward legal and practical issue. In this
section, we will briefly describe the legal and
practical aspects related to our concept of interest—
namely what is ‘‘chemical action.’’ As discussed in
detail below, the difference between drugs and
devices is that drugs work via ‘‘chemical action,’’
while devices work physically or mechanically.
The key to complex statutory scope and interpre-
tation questions is often found in definitions. The
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA, 21 USC §301
et. seq.) is no exception. The definitions contained
within the FDCA determine jurisdiction—does the
FDCA apply to the product or activity in question?
Once jurisdiction is established, the definitions
determine regulatory pathways and requirements.
Therefore, one must look to key FDCA definitions
to determine whether a specific nanotechnology-
based product is (1) covered by the FDCA and, if so,
(2) what requirements must be satisfied before that
product can be marketed (key definitions are gener-
ally found in 21 U.S.C. §321).
Generally speaking, medical products, whether
therapeutic or diagnostic, are considered drugs (21
U.S.C. §321(g)), devices (21 U.S.C. §321(h)), or
biologics (42 U.S.C. §262(i)). Separate centers within
FDA have responsibility and jurisdiction over these
different categories of products.3 The Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) regulates drugs, the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
(CBER) covers biologics, and the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (CDRH) has jurisdiction
over medical devices.
While these statutory ‘‘details’’ might be interest-
ing to regulatory specialists, these details make a real-
life difference for nanotechnology-based products.
Drugs and medical devices follow very different
regulatory pathways and have different requirements,
different time lines, and different cost structures. The
determination of whether a new product is a drug or
device has practical, financial, and research-related
ramifications.
The obvious question is whether it makes much of
difference whether some product is defined as a drug
or as a medical device. The answer is that it makes a
tremendous difference. A new drug takes hundreds of
millions of dollars, more than a decade, and
thousands of clinical trial subjects to get market
approval. A new device takes a fraction of that
amount of money, time, or clinical trial subjects.
While a detailed description of the difference
between regulatory processes applicable to drugs
and those relevant to medical devices is beyond the
scope of this paper, some key differences must be
noted.
Any ‘‘new drug’’4 must be approved for distribu-
tion pursuant to the New Drug Application (NDA)
process (21 U.S.C. §355(a)–(d) and 21 C.F.R. 314).
The NDA is based upon extensive preclinical and
clinical research, including a three-phase clinical trial
process. Clinical trials may total several tens of
thousands of patients (21 U.S.C. §355(i) and 21
C.F.R. 312).
Conversely, new medical devices are subject to a
three-tier, risk-based regulatory system. Low risk (or
Class I) devices need no premarket review by FDA—
these devices are subject to ‘‘general controls.’’
Medium risk devices (generally Class II device) are
cleared for market under the 510(k) process, if the
device is ‘‘substantially equivalent’’ to a predicate
product already legally marketed. Only about
10–15% of 510(k) clearances involve the submission
of clinical data.
Class III devices generally must go through the
PreMarket Approval (PMA) process. This is concep-
tually closest to the NDA process and usually
includes clinical trials regulated under 21 U.S.C.
§360j(g). Rather than clinical trials lasting for years
and involving several tens of thousands of clinical
trial subjects, device clinical trials (or IDE studies)
are usually much shorter in duration and often
involve only hundreds of subjects (21 C.F.R. 812).
In summary, even the most complex devices often
take years less to develop and only 10–20% of the
cost of bringing a new drug on the market. The
definitional difference between drugs and medical
devices thus impacts patient access to new products,3 FDA generally does not regulate the practice of medicine.
See, for example, 21 USC §396. Also, dietary supplements and
certain foods can make health claims without being considered
drugs, devices, or biologics. 21 USC §343(r) sets forth some
requirements for foods making health claims. For our purposes,
these exceptions will not be discussed in any detail.
4 ‘‘New drugs’’ are defined under 21 U.S.C. §321(p) and,
generally speaking, including any new compound or new use
of an old compound that came into existence after 1938.
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the timing of such access, and cost. Putting a
particular nano product into the wrong category risks
either excessive regulation or inadequate safety and
efficacy review. As such, the chemical action
distinction becomes critical.
Statutory background
To start, one must understand the definition of a
‘‘drug’’ and a ‘‘medical device.’’
In relevant part, drugs are defined in 21 USC
321(g) as:
(1) The term ‘‘drug’’ means
(A) …
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man or other animals; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and
(D) articles intended for use as a component
of any article specified in clause (A), (B),
or (C)….
The relevant portions of the definition of a device
under 21 USC §321(h) are:
The term ‘‘device’’ (except when used in
paragraph (n) of this section and in sec-
tions 301(i), 403(f), 502(c), and 602(c)) means
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other
similar or related article, including any compo-
nent, part, or accessory, which is
(1) …
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or
other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals, and which
does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body
of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes.
These definitions have several key common features.
First, both are based on the intended use of the
product. By using the intended use of the product,
rather than what the product actually does in real life,
FDA can exercise authority over quack or sham
products. An unscrupulous person cannot evade FDA
enforcement by arguing that his or her product did
not actually treat any disease or otherwise have any
therapeutic or diagnostic effect. Both definitions take
similar conceptual approaches to this aspect of
definitional scope.
Next, both definitions include products that are
intended to treat, cure, mitigate, prevent, or diagnose
disease. With minor differences, the language covers
the same types of intended uses for both drugs and
devices. Without the chemical action distinction,
discussed below, the same product would be both a
drug and a device.
Finally, each definition includes components of the
product (and in the case of devices, accessories and
parts).
At this point, the same product would easily satisfy
both definitions. For example, a cancer drug is an
‘‘article’’ ‘‘intended to’’ ‘‘treat or mitigate’’ a disease
(cancer) in a person. An artificial knee is also an
‘‘article’’ ‘‘intended to’’ ‘‘treat or mitigate’’ a disease
(arthritis or knee injury in this case) in a person. Does
this mean that all drugs are devices and all devices
are drugs? Such an overlap violates common sense
and norms of statutory construction. It would also
subject the same product to vastly different regula-
tory systems. The key then is to isolate the fea-
ture(s) within the statutory schema that differentiate
drugs from devices.
The last part of the definition of a device provides
the key to separating drugs and devices. As stated in
21 USC §321(h), a device ‘‘does not achieve its
primary intended purposes through chemical action
within or on the body of man or other animals and
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for
the achievement of its primary intended purposes.’’
Simplistically, drugs work via ‘‘chemical action,’’
while devices work via physics (or mechanically).5
5 For our purposes, the metabolism element is not relevant. We
do point out the, perhaps inappropriate, use of the ‘‘and’’
connector between the ‘‘chemical action’’ clause and the
metabolism clause. In general usage, this has been interpreted
as meaning ‘‘or.’’
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In most cases, the difference between operating via
physical principles and chemical action is clear. Except
at the most obtuse level, a stethoscope works via the
laws of physics. Under this definition, an artificial knee
is clearly a device, as it does not act chemically. The
same is true for a heart valve, an artificial joint, or an
infusion pump. Drugs, such as oncology products and
antidepressants, work via a chemical interaction
between the drug and the target cell.
As long as the distinction between chemistry and
physics (or mechanical action) is clear, this defini-
tional schema works. Of course, this distinction is
precisely what is put to task in cases of nanotech-
nology-based products.
Possible approaches to the problem
There are three very reasonable approaches to
determining how to classify nanotechnology-based
products as drugs or devices in line with the idea that
it is ‘‘chemical action’’ that distinguishes them. The
first is to look to further legal information (including
the history of the related statutes) in an effort to
determine the ideas that are central to this classifi-
catory distinction. We call this the legal-historical
approach. The second is to look to how such products
might be classified in other areas of inquiry. For
example, one might ask the chemists how they
distinguish these articles. We call this the institutional
approach. Third, one might ask whether or not the
world draws a distinction between drugs and devices;
that is, can we discover, by the proper progress of
science, properties of the nanotechnology-based
products in question that place them firmly under
one or the other classifications? In this section, we
will examine these three approaches and discuss why
none of them are sufficient for classifying nanotech-
nology-based products into the existing statutory
scheme.
The legal-historical approach
Under 21 U.S.C. 321(h), the main factors that
separate a ‘‘device’’ from a ‘‘drug’’ are that a device:
(1) is ‘‘an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar
or related article, including any component, part, or
accessory,’’ (2) that ‘‘does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or
on the body of man,’’ and (3) ‘‘is not dependent upon
being metabolized for the achievement of its primary
intended purposes.’’ Since the concept of being a
‘‘primary intended purpose’’ is relatively well under-
stood legally, we will focus on (2), since it contains
the only remaining legally difficult concept—chem-
ical action.
Initially, one must understand the rules of construc-
tion or interpretation of complex statutory terms and
concepts. In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Supreme Court set a standard for determining the
meaning of the term ‘‘stationary source’’ under
the Clean Air Act of 1977. This standard included the
use of dictionary definitions, statutory structure,
legislative purpose, legislative history, and agency
interpretation to determine the meaning of ‘‘stationary
source.’’ In this way, there is a strong legal tradition
that supports attempting to resolve the meaning of the
term ‘‘chemical action’’ in the same manner.
Unfortunately, this same approach provides little
value in defining the mode of action of most
nanotechnology-based products. Part of the problem
with dictionary definitions for terms such as ‘‘chem-
ical action’’ is their inability to handle novel cases,
especially those generated by emerging technologies
and scientific advance. Nanotechnology is a prime
example of such a failure. The dictionary definitions
for terms like ‘‘chemistry’’ have hardly changed
despite leaps in the understanding of chemistry.
‘‘Chemical’’ has consistently been known as a term
‘‘of or pertaining to chemistry (Merriam-Webster’s
Medical Dictionary 2007).’’ In 1912, a few years after
the FDA was created, Webster’s New International
Dictionary of the English Language defined ‘‘chem-
istry’’ as ‘‘the science that treats of the composition of
substances, and of the transformations which they
undergo.’’ Today, the same dictionary defines chem-
istry differently, as ‘‘a science that deals with the
composition, structure, and properties of substances
and of the transformations that they undergo’’
(Webster’s 2002, emphasis added). Though the
difference between the two definitions is small, the
new terms supposedly reflect fundamental advance-
ments in scientific knowledge, such as Neils Bohr’s
theory of atomic structure in 1912, and redefinition of
the field because of the branching of fields such as
J Nanopart Res (2011) 13:1401–1417 1405
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nuclear physics and quantum chemistry, developed in
the mid to late twentieth century. This example
demonstrates the problem: dictionary definitions are
reactionary only; there is a lag between new ideas and
technologies and their dictionary counterparts. As a
result, they offer little guidance in the case of
genuinely novel technologies or scientific advances.
Other portions of the FDCA may shed light on the
meaning of ‘‘chemical action’’ and ‘‘metabolism.’’
Particularly, 321(p) defines a ‘‘new drug’’ as ‘‘any
drug…the composition of which is such that such
drug is not generally recognized, among experts…as
safe and effective for use under the condition
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the label-
ing thereof.’’ This definition is dependent on ‘‘insti-
tutional’’ conceptions—the beliefs of scientists and
experts about the novelty of the drug. This institu-
tional component generates its own problems, which
we will consider in the next section.
Additionally, to clarify the ‘‘new drug’’ definition,
FDA required that a new drug must be ‘‘new
chemical entity,’’ which is a term of particular
interest because it may lead to a meaning of
‘‘chemical action.’’ The FDA has previously defined
‘‘new chemical entity’’ to mean a drug that contains
no ‘‘active moiety’’ that has previously been
approved by FDA. ‘‘Active moiety,’’ in turn, means
‘‘the molecule or ion … or other noncovalent
derivative…of the molecule, responsible for the
physiological or pharmacological action of the drug
substance’’ (21 C.F.R. 314.108). One conclusion may
be drawn from this definition: the FDA has previ-
ously asserted that the term chemical in the new drug
context involves ‘‘molecules’’ or ‘‘ions’’ that are
‘‘responsible for’’ the action of the drug. Though this
definition of chemical within the new drug context is
not binding on the Agency in making initial defini-
tional decisions, it provides one persuasive (though
incomplete) interpretation of ‘‘chemical action.’’ Our
own account will make use of this idea. However,
since ‘‘new drug’’ is a subset of ‘‘drug,’’ it does not
follow that moiety is sufficient to generate a distinc-
tion between ‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices’’—it merely
identifies a subset of the ‘‘drug’’ class.
FDA has been given broad discretion to apply its
regulations in a manner to promote public health.
Courts have interpreted the FDCA to have a ‘‘reme-
dial purpose’’ (Bacto-Unidisk 1969). The FDA was
originally created to ‘‘effectuate the congressional
purpose of protecting the public’’ from unsafe drugs,
or ‘‘quack’’ devices that made untruthful promises to
consumers or were otherwise unsafe (understanding
that safety is a relative term). In view of this remedial
purpose, the Bacto-Unidisk court’s reasoning sug-
gests that, among the competing considerations in
defining chemical action, the greatest value should be
assigned to factors that ‘‘protect the public.’’ Thus, as
detailed above, legislative intent or history only tells
us that there is a desire to protect the public, not the
details of defining nanoproducts. This is of little value
in classifying ‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices,’’ since both are
regulated with public safety in mind. However, it
may be of some help in hopelessly ambiguous cases:
if we should find an article which cannot be properly
classified as to its nature as a drug or device, we
should place it in the class that would lead to the
greatest consumer protection.
When the language or application of a statute is
unclear, courts and administrative agencies com-
monly turn to legislative history for guidance (Bacto-
Unidisk 1969). In particular, understanding the
legislative history behind major changes to the
definitional structure of the FDCA made in 1938,
1976, and 1990 may help explain differences between
‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices’’ and the crucial ‘‘chemical
action’’ distinction.
The 1938 amendments
Before the 1938 changes to the Pure Food and Drug
Act of 1906, FDA had little ability to control
therapeutic claims made for drugs and devices
(Merrill 1996). Medical devices were generally
simple devices such as bandages and scalpels that
presented few technological issues and whose use
was generally obvious to physicians and patients
(FDA 1997).
In 1938, the Food and Drug Act defined drugs
narrowly, with no specific mention of devices.
Specially, drugs were defined as ‘‘all medicines and
preparations recognized in the United States Phar-
macopoeia or National Formulary for internal or
external use, and any substance or mixture of
substances intended to be used for the cure, mitiga-
tion, or prevention of disease of either man or other
animals’’ (Bacto-Unidisk 1969, pp. 793–794).
This narrow 1906 definition of drugs left ‘‘quack’’
devices out of the legal control of FDA, leaving
1406 J Nanopart Res (2011) 13:1401–1417
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consumers unprotected from products such as
‘‘radium belts’’ and ‘‘slenderizers’’ (Senate Report
No. 361 1935). This led Senator Copeland of New
York, the sponsor of the 1938 FDCA, to include ‘‘all
substances, preparations, and devices intended for use
in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man’’ into the definition of ‘‘drug’’ (Senate
Report No. 493 1934). The inclusion of ‘‘devices’’ in
the definition of ‘‘drugs’’ sparked a lively debate in
the Senate, with Senator Clark calling the treatment
of a ‘‘purely mechanical device’’ as a drug in ‘‘law
and in logic…a palpable absurdity’’ (Congressional
Record 1935, p. 4811). The final bill proposed a
definition of ‘‘device’’ paralleling the definition of
‘‘drug,’’ even though both were regulated in the same
manner at the time.
In Bacto-Unidisk, the Supreme Court interpreted
the legislative history behind this parallel definitional
structure and concluded that the differences between
drugs and devices were ‘‘provided for semantic
reasons only’’ (Bacto-Unidisk 1969, p. 797). The
Court used this reasoning to support a broadly
inclusive definition of ‘‘drugs’’ and held that an
antibiotic sensitivity test disc used in laboratories was
a ‘‘drug’’ within the meaning of §321.
However, the approach of Congress to regulate
devices in ‘‘terms that accurately describe [devices]’’
rather than as drugs may be interpreted differently
(Congressional Record 1935, p. 4812). The debate in
the Senate suggests that Senator Clark and his
colleagues saw an innate difference between mechan-
ical operation of devices and ‘‘drugs.’’ Despite
arguably treating drugs and devices equally at this
time, Congress may have emphasized the definitional
difference because it sought to avoid future regula-
tory problems arising from legally equating two
entities with innate differences. In addition, it is
plausible that Congress’ later amendments in 1976,
essentially overturning the specific holding of Bacto-
Unidisk, reaffirm the definitional and regulatory
differences between ‘‘drug’’ status and ‘‘device’’
status. Nonetheless, the legislative history from the
1938 Amendments does not clearly elucidate Con-
gress’ intent surrounding the specific differences
between ‘‘drugs’’ and ‘‘devices,’’ apart from the few
and incomplete examples mentioned in floor debates.
Under the original 1938 approach and Bacto-Unidisk,
a nano-product could be regulated as a drug regard-
less of its mode of action.
It is also instructive to remember the state of
scientific knowledge about the mechanisms of chem-
ical actions in the mid 1930s. The general consensus
among experts is that physics and chemistry became
clearly distinct scientific subjects in the 1830s (Nye
1993). When the FDCA was being adopted, scholars
were just starting to challenge the distinctions between
chemistry and physics (Nye 1993). Thus, the differ-
ence between a mechanical device and a chemical drug
was much clearer in the 1930s than it is today, despite
significant progress in the sciences since then.
The medical device amendments of 1976
The 1938 Act only gave FDA the authority to remove
misbranded medical devices from the market, not the
authority to review medical devices before entering
the market. Subsequent amendments in 1962 estab-
lished a premarket review and approval process for
drug efficacy, but the amendments did not apply to
devices.6 This reinforces the idea that Congress
viewed devices and drugs differently. This gap in
regulatory requirements for drugs and devices set the
stage for Bacto-Unidisk, which gave FDA greater
discretion in regulating some items commonly
thought to be devices as drugs, in order to place
greater controls on these devices.
Congress adopted the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976 (MDA) in response to the confusion
between drugs and devices, the findings of the
Cooper Commission suggesting that medical devices
caused thousands of deaths and several incidents
involving pacemaker failures and the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device (Hutt et al. 2007). Aside from
creating a tiered approval process for devices to
ensure greater consumer protection from the riskiest
devices, Congress refined the boundaries between
drugs and devices. According to the amended statute,
a device does not achieve any of its ‘‘principal
intended purposes through chemical action and…is
not dependent upon being metabolized,’’ and a
‘‘drug’’ does not include ‘‘devices or their compo-
nents.’’ The reasoning behind this definition was
discussed in Senate debates:
6 There was some pending device-specific legislation around
the same time as the 1962 drug amendments. Perhaps because
of the challenge posed by thalidomide, the drug amendments
were passed, but the proposed device amendments languished.
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Drugs, which are basically chemical entities,
are consumed on a short-term individual dosage
basis and are changed or destroyed in the body.
Devices, on the other hand, which involve all
the physical sciences plus all the divisions of
the biological sciences, are used on an individ-
ual product basis for a short time or for the life
time of the patient, and are usually intended to
be as inert as possible (Congressional Records
1975).
Note that Congress is linking drugs with chemicals
and devices with the ‘‘physical sciences.’’ This
difference subsequently becomes the fundamental
basis for differentiating between drugs and devices
that operate at the nano-scale.
Safe medical device act of 1990
In 1990, Congress made a minor modification to the
definitions of drugs and devices in 21 USC
321(g) and (h). These amendments altered (1) in
paragraph (g)(1) by striking out ‘‘but does not include
devices or their components, parts, or accessories,’’
and (2) in paragraph (h)(3) by striking out ‘‘any of its
principal’’ and inserting instead ‘‘its primary.’’
The committee report in the Senate contains the
only discussion of these particular modifications,
stating, ‘‘The definitions of ‘drug’ and ‘device’ have
been slightly altered to accommodate the principle of
section 20 [addressing Combination Products]’’ (Sen-
ate Report No. 513 1990, pp. 30–31). Thus, the
modifications were likely intended to conform to the
terminology established in the combination products
regime and to allow FDA to regulate a combination
product with both device and drug components as a
drug, if it so chose. These amendments were likely
not intended to clarify the meanings of ‘‘drugs’’ and
‘‘devices.’’ Without these changes, a combination
product that included drug and device components
could not be regulated as a drug, even if the drug
portion was the ‘‘principal mode of action’’ (PMOA).
In developing the combination product regulatory
structure, Congress retained the core definitions and
allowed the regulatory structure responsible for the
primary mode of action to handle the regulatory
needs. This concept also reinforces the concept that
the method or mode of action of the article is a key
differentiating factor between drugs and devices.
Combining the Chevron doctrine, statutory lan-
guage, and legislative history, there are two main
conclusions: (1) legal analysis does not completely
resolve the problem because dictionary definitions are
unclear and the legislative history is not dispositive,
but (2) it does give us a starting point for under-
standing chemical action and metabolism from gen-
eral statutory purpose and statutory structure:
‘‘chemical’’ means something to do with molecules
and ions, and we should err on the side of greater
‘‘public protection’’ in view of the larger statutory
purpose.
It is worth noting that if Congress had explicitly
defined ‘‘chemical action,’’ that definition must be
used to assign nanoproducts into the drug or device
worlds. This is so even if the Congressional definition
made no sense to scientists. Given that FDA is a
creature of statute and is completely reliant on statute
for its existence and power, Congress can make
whatever definitional assignments it chooses. Unfor-
tunately, the statutory language and legislative
history simply does not answer the question. As
such, other analytical approaches must also be
considered.
The institutional approach
In light of the indeterminacy left by legal analysis, we
will broaden our search for a precise account of
chemical action, and, in turn, ‘‘drug.’’ There is a very
simple strategy for determining whether some article
operates by chemical action, rather than by mechan-
ical action. This strategy faces serious problems in
our current scientific environment. Understanding
what is wrong with this strategy makes clear the need
for a more fine-grained approach, which we offer in
section the next section.
We call this strategy the institutional approach. On
this account, we determine whether an article oper-
ates by chemical action by asking which department
at the local university or similar ‘‘expert’’ institution
is the one that developed the article or the theory by
which the article was developed. In the past, the
institutional approach was very effective. For exam-
ple, chemists and chemical engineers were the
owners of such articles as plastic or detergent,
whereas physicists and physical engineers were the
owners such articles as the wheel or the clock.
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A problem arises due to the conventional nature of
the institutional approach: the conventions we once
used for carving up the sciences are now out-
moded and obsolete. To see this problem clearly,
we only need to look to articles that are conver-
gent technologies.
Convergent technologies, especially ones that are
really, really tiny, and with really, really big surface
areas, break traditional boundaries—they are
designed and understood by a number of theoretical
and applied sciences. For example, designing a
particular object may require theorists from several
fields, like cellular biology, quantum mechanics, and
computer science, as well as engineers from chemical
engineering, mechanical engineering, and so on. To
which area, specialization, or science does this new
nanotechnology belong? Consider the recent devel-
opments in nano-origami. Nano-origami is the fold-
ing of nano-scale materials into three-dimensional
shapes. One could design a tiny box, complete with a
latch that can be opened with a magnetic current.
Such a box could be used to deliver and release anti-
bacterials, for example. Would such a nano-box with
a medical payload fall under the purview of chemical
or physical engineering? Would it use only physical
theories, which are the purview of physicists? Or,
would it require a good deal of chemical, medical,
and biological theories, as well? We take it that there
is no simple and obviously non-arbitrary answer to
these questions. It follows that its uses, functioning,
or limitations are not ‘‘owned’’ by any one theory or
body of theories within any of the traditional
divisions of the sciences.
The institutional approach depends on decades old
differentiation between chemistry and physics (or the
mechanical arts). This institutional approach was
current, and the state of the art across the scientific
world when the drug/device regulatory system was
created in the mid to late 1930s. As we saw earlier,
there is a need to update these ideas. That is, the
institutional approach at the very least needs an
upgrade.
The actuality approach
A third and more bottom-up approach than the
institutional approach is available. We call this
approach the actuality approach. Rather than appeal
to rather outdated and arbitrary conventions of days
gone by, one might think that the world itself and
current scientific knowledge will tell us whether
something is chemical or not. In fact, it is quite
reasonable to think that certain theories, like chem-
istry, are a response to our need to predict certain
kinds of actual phenomena. Consequently, whether a
particular phenomenon belongs to a certain science
depends not on mere institutional conventions; rather,
it depends on the concepts required to predict and
understand the phenomenon. That is, something is a
chemical action (a kind of phenomenon) if we need
concepts from our best theories of chemistry to
predict and understand that action. Put another way,
if chemistry is a response to the way the world is,
then we have discovered chemical properties of the
world: the science of chemistry is required to
understand some phenomena.
One might think that the actuality approach also
faces a serious problem in light of convergent
technologies. It is not so obvious to us that it
does—if theories of chemistry are employed in the
development and understanding of nano-technology,
then there is some sense in which the end product
(does or does not) operate by chemical action. The
problem is now to say what counts as a chemical
theory, since we cannot identify such a theory by
mere appeal to the institutional approach. This points
us to a second problem well known to philosophers
and generated by physicalism.7
Physicalism is the well-accepted belief that, at the
bottom, all phenomena are physical phenomena. That
is, almost all of the hard sciences accept that the
objects and processes they study are literally physical
objects and processes that can be explained or
described physically (e.g., using theories of physics).
While it may be useful to talk about organisms or
neurotransmitters, in the end these, like all other
things, are made up of particles and their relations are
described in the language of physics. This assumption
makes trouble for the actuality approach: chemical
concepts (and theories) differ from physical concepts
(and theories) only in terms of their utility. The
phenomena understood and predicted by chemical
theories could be (though it may be very difficult and
time consuming) captured entirely by physical
7 Physicalism is a term that can be traced back to Otto Neurath
(2000).
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theories, if this well-accepted assumption is correct.
Thus, the actuality approach faces a very different
problem than the institutional approach: chemical
theories are just different from physical theories in
practice—there is nothing about the world itself
(other than our need to predict in a relatively accurate
and effective manner) that distinguishes the two
theories. Chemistry is simply a wholly included
subset of physics. In essence, it is believed that we
could re-write all the chemical theories in terms of
our physical theories.
As can be seen, none of these three basic
approaches provides a clear, concise, or predictable
answer to the question about whether or not an article
has as a primary mode of action one that is chemical
rather than physical. As such, we now proceed to
offer an approach that seeks to be true to the statutory
language and legislative intent and also is true to
science and logic.
The four pillars of chemical action
In this section, we present the four key ideas to
understanding chemical action in the FDA context.
These pillars of chemical action are aimed at
balancing and resolving the problems with the
legal-historical approach, the institutional approach,
and the actuality approach. The goal is to produce an
account of ‘‘chemical action’’ that meets the legal and
regulatory needs, while also being sensitive to the
scientific, philosophical, and legal questions articles
such as nanotechnologies pose. In this section, we
will discuss the pillars fairly generally. When these
pillars are applied as principles they become useful
for regulators. In the next section, we will utilize
these four pillars and the existing statutory structure
to provide an ‘‘algorithm’’ to aid in the regulation of
articles (especially nanotechnologies) in terms of
their nature as either drugs or devices. That is, when
the principles are applied to individual cases, they
serve to determine if the case in question is one where
a distinctly chemical, rather than physical, action is
the primary mode of action.
The four pillars of chemical action are as follows:
(1) the chemicality principle, (2) the causality
principle, (3) the singularity principle, and (4) the
locality principle. The first principle is used to target
the philosophical problem raised by physicalism,
which is especially salient in the case of nanotech-
nologies. The other three principles are designed to
help resolve problems raised by convergent technol-
ogies and the multiplicity of events that occur
throughout a treatment.
The chemicality principle
By way of quick review, physicalism is just the idea
that all things are, at the bottom, just particles and
forces—just as physics describes. For our purposes, it
might be easiest to imagine it this way: if a chemical
bond can be completely described using quantum
mechanics (one of our most predictively successful
theories of physics), then in what sense is it a
chemical thing and not merely a physical thing? The
mode of action can be completely and accurately
described using the concepts, theories, and language
of physics. The physicalists suggest that this demon-
strates that the process of chemical bonding is not
some special new thing; rather, it is just another
action of the simple particles and forces described by
physics. That is, physicalism suggests that all actions,
whether psychological, biological, or chemical are
just (sometimes very complex) physical actions. As a
result, there can be no difference between drugs and
devices, as described in the legislation, because there
is no real such thing as ‘‘chemical action.’’
Our chemicality principle suggests that there is a
difference worth noting that supports a non-arbitrary
distinction between chemical things and physical
things. There is a noteworthy difference between
ontology and explanation. Ontologically speaking, all
things might well be physical things, as physicalism
suggests. However, it does not follow that it is best to
explain all phenomena using our best physical
theories. Explanations can, and should, make use of
concepts that are not strictly ‘‘at the bottom.’’ That is,
even though you and I are simply particles operated
on by physical forces (ontologically speaking), it
does not follow that best explanation of your reading
of or my typing of this paper is best explained using
all and only physical concepts, such as particles and
forces. Consider a couple of examples: Fodor’s
Lunch and Lotka-Voltera equations.
Jerry Fodor argues that folk psychology, our
everyday theory of the behaviors of ourselves and
others, does an excellent job of explaining everyday
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interactions. His arguments suggest the following sort
of story of Fodor’s Lunch (Fodor 1990). Imagine
Jerry Fodor tells you that he will meet you for lunch
to discuss his most recent work. The next morning
you awake, and you are interested in predicting
whether Jerry will meet you; you are also interested
in explaining why you think he will meet you. If you
were to proceed using the ontologically most basic
things (forces and particles), you are in for a very
long (if not impossibly complex) set of calculations.
Not only that, it is not at all clear that you will have
explained why he ultimately met you, why you
believed he would, or any of the other steps in
between. In fact, prediction an explanation of this
event, his meeting you for lunch, are not only more
easily, but perhaps best, given in terms of our
everyday psychology—using concepts such as inten-
tion, promise keeping, memory, and so on. Fodor’s
Lunch suggests that there are good psychological
explanations that we have reason to keep and accept,
even though the world is only made up of particles
and forces.
Another good example comes from work by Elliott
Sober (2000) and makes use of the Lotka-Volterra
equations in biology. The Lotka-Volterra equations
provide us with a model that predicts predator–prey
relationships in a particular environment. Predation,
for example, is not obviously nor easily reduced to
physical concepts. Furthermore, the model correctly
(truthfully) predicts the number of predators in an
environment. Thus, by way of explanation, the Lotka-
Volterra equations (and the related concepts) explain
the number of predators by the number of prey
animals. Thus, we have a biological explanation that
is an accurate predictor and also potentially true. This
is a nice example, because it shows that we do not
need to reduce to the ‘‘at bottom’’ concepts for a
truthful explanation (and also prediction) of the way
the world is. It also very nicely shows that there
would be something lost by reducing to the ‘‘at
bottom’’ concepts (like particles and force)—we
would not be able to explain why there are the
number of predators there are in a particular
environment. For example, the equations explain
and predict why predator populations increase and by
how much when there is an explosion in the prey
population. This truth finds no home in the language
of particles and forces, yet properly describes a state
of the world.
Our chemicality principle turns on this idea that
there is a difference between ontology (what things
there are) and explanation (how we properly and
predicatively describe the things there are). As with
the two examples above, there are chemical concepts
that do similar work in explanation and prediction.
Even if there are physical (force and particle)
correlates of these concepts, there would still be a
chemical explanation. As of the current state of
chemistry and physics, there are some chemical
concepts that both do a lot of explanatory work and
also are irreducible to physical explanation. Accord-
ing to Lombardi and Labarca (2005), molecular
shape, chemical bond, and orbital are not describable
in terms of Quantum Mechanics—that is, they have
no physical explanatory analog. Thus, we propose
that any explanation of the operation of an article that
requires a chemical explanation (or could be given
one with some gain in information—as the concept of
predation in the biological case) counts as a chemical
explanation. This is half of the puzzle: we know what
‘‘chemical’’ means in chemical action. Further, it
resolves the trouble raised by physicalism by appeal-
ing to information provided by a chemical explana-
tion rather than simple ‘‘at bottom’’ account of the
physical nature of things.
The causality principle
Now that we have addressed what it means to be
‘‘chemical’’ in a chemical mode of action, our next
task is to say what it is to be a mode of action. Our
analysis of mode of action is to treat it as a cause.
That is, an article has a primary mode of action that is
chemical if and only if there is a chemical explana-
tion of the article’s interaction at the site of treatment
whereby the article is described such that it is
casually efficacious. In the next three subsections, we
will spell out the details of this set of ideas.
One theory of causation that fits closely with
several primary legal ideas of causation is probabi-
listic causation. Probabilistic causation, at its heart, is
the idea that a cause is anything that increases the
probability of some outcome. For example, sticking
your finger in the light socket is a cause of
electrocution, even if sometimes one is not electro-
cuted by so doing. Eells (1991) describes a fairly
comprehensive theory of probabilistic causation. We
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will use the basics of his theory to help us understand
what it is to be a mode of action and further to
understand what it is to be a primary mode of action.
A probabilistic framework for causation sits nicely
with a number of legal notions. Consider one
example from tort law. Imagine there is an accident
in which a car hits a median. If driver error is not the
cause of the accident, one can imagine an injured
driver suing the car manufacturer, the tire manufac-
turer, and the city that constructed and maintains that
stretch of road. This makes a good deal of sense on
the probabilistic view because if it was not the driver
who was at fault, then things like tires, accelerators,
steering columns, and road maintenance and design
are all factors that increase or decrease the probability
of such an accident. In fact, it is perfectly possible
that all of these things, jointly or severally, are causes
of the accident.
An obvious problem arises for providing an
analysis of chemical action in the probabilistic
framework: we are interested in whether or not the
article operates primarily by chemical action, not
merely whether there is a chemical explanation of a
cause of treatment. Let us call this the problem of
relata. In the probabilistic framework, x causes y if
and only if x increases the probability of y (in fixed
framework z). x, y, and z are known as relata. If we
want to know whether some article chemically causes
some treatment, we will have to know what x, y, and
z are. To resolve these questions, we will need our
last two principles: the singularity principle and the
locality principle.
The singularity principle and the locality principle
For the sake of example, let us imagine a new anti-
cancer article. This article is introduced orally and
takes some time to break down before it is taken up
into the bloodstream and produces any tumor reduc-
tion results. As it breaks down, part of the article
resolves into high levels of calcium. This calcium, in
turn, produces an increase in probability of constipa-
tion in humans. Is this article a drug? It seems that it
may be. First, it produces an increase in probability of
two effects: tumor reduction and constipation. Sec-
ond, the constipation is a result of a chemical change
that is the result of the introduction of the article (the
additional production of calcium in the system).
While this is a completely hypothetical example, it
serves to show why we need to resolve the problem of
relata. Recall that for an article to be considered a
drug, it must have a primary mode of action that is
chemical. Is the side effect of production of calcium
the sort of thing that would be considered a primary
mode of action? Surely not.
In our probabilistic framework, it is relatively easy
to resolve part of the problem of relata. For x to cause
y in framework z, x must increase the probability of
y with respect to z. y and z are relatively easy to
understand, so we will begin there. When the FDA
evaluates new drugs and devices, they are partly
characterized by their primary intended purpose. That
is, they are described in terms of what they are
supposed to do. This idea of primary intended
purpose will serve to identify the y and z relata. y is
the proposed treatment. So, we are really asking: does
the chemical action of the article increase the
probability of the treatment (y)? Returning to our
example, the constipation is not the primary intended
purpose of the article, so the chemical change that
produces this effect is irrelevant for our classificatory
purposes. Something cannot be deemed a drug
because of some side effect; it must be the intended
effect that is used in the analysis.
z is also relatively easy to understand; z is the
entire state of the world. The purpose of control
studies is to show that altering a single part of the
environment produces an increase in the probability
of some effect (treatment). Control studies are good
because they provide a way of showing that no other
factor is the cause of the positive outcome other than
the single altered item of interest. Thus, returning to
our cancer treatment, we want to know if the
introduction of the article and not some other thing,
such as placebo effect, produces the tumor reduction.
If we were able to hold fixed all the entire state of the
world except for the chemical action of the article, we
would know for sure that it was the article that
produced the treatment.
At first, x appears to be relatively easy to identify, as
well; it is the article in question. However, it is not as
easy as that, since it must be x’s chemical properties
that increase the probability of the effect and it must be
primarily these—otherwise we cannot say if the article
(x)’s primary mode of action is chemical. To resolve
this remaining problem, we will need the singularity
principle and the locality principle.
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The singularity principle demands that we identify
a result of the article that produces the treatment.
Recall, the legal notion of causation is broad. In the
car accident, it is very reasonable to say the cause of
the accident was the tires, the road, and the design of
the car; it is also reasonable to say that each of these
is a cause in the accident. This broad concept must be
narrowed if we are to determine whether it is a
chemical action of the article that produces the
treatment. This is akin to asking whether the tires
were, in fact, a probability increaser of the accident.
So, if some studies show that our anti-cancer article is
associated with tumor reduction, the singularity
principle demands that we identify the article as a
probability increaser of the tumor reduction. When
paired with the chemicality principle, there must be a
chemical explanation of the article’s increase in
probability of the treatment. That is, the article’s
action must involve change in molecular shape,
chemical bonding, or some other factor so long as it
can be described using standard concepts in chemis-
try on its way to increasing the probability of the
treatment.
To see how the locality principle comes into play,
we can return to our hypothetical anti-cancer article.
Imagine that this article, when introduced to the
body, does increase the probability of tumor reduc-
tion. Further, when ingested, there is a change in the
article’s molecular shape that produces the constipa-
tion. In addition, there is a further chemical change in
the article when it is excreted from the body. These
two chemical changes occur upstream and down-
stream of the treatment, and, as a result, these
chemical changes are not salient to classifying the
article as having a primary mode of action that is
chemical and should be ignored. This problem is
resolved by the locality principle. This principle
demands that we look to the treatment site to
determine whether or not the article increases the
probability of tumor reduction by chemical action.
Recall that the treatment is determined by the primary
intended purpose of the article, here tumor reduction.
Thus, to avoid being distracted by chemical changes
that occur upstream or downstream of the treatment,
we look to the tumor areas to see if there is a
chemical change in the article that causes the tumor
reduction.
The four principles work together to provide us
with an account of chemical action as it pertains to
the classification of articles as either drugs or devices.
Put simply, an article is a drug if it meets the
following description:
There must exist an explanation in terms of
chemical concepts (chemicality principle)
whereby the article in question (the singularity
principle), by undergoing some chemical
change, increases the probability (the causality
principle) of the treatment, at the site of
treatment (the locality principle).
In the next section, we introduce an algorithm
intended to guide regulators in determining whether
an article fits the above description. Later we will
provide two ‘‘real life’’ examples that could be
resolved using our algorithm.
The chemical action algorithm
Definitional aspects of algorithm: the centrality
of the locality principle
1. We begin by determining primary intended
purpose, in combination with the locality and
singularity principles. Primary intended purpose
is determined by first determining the therapeutic
effect (treatment). With that in hand, we can
identify the primary causal chain. This is the
sequence of events that is necessary for, or
creates the greatest likelihood, producing the
therapeutic effect.
2. We determine the mode of action by reviewing
the intended therapy at the ‘‘locality’’ of the
treatment. The relevant assessment is conducted
at the first interaction between the article and the
local therapy site on the primary causal chain.
3. There are often multiple causes and effects on,
near, or related to the chain from introduction of
the article to final treatment effect. The locality
point of interest includes the following cause and
effect relationships:
a. The cause we are interested in is the action at
the site where the article interacts with the
body to achieve the intended purpose.
b. The effect we are interested in is the primary
or triggering therapeutic effect the article has
on the body on the chain to treatment. [We
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define ‘‘therapy’’ to include mitigation, pre-
vention, affecting structure, etc.]
4. Looking through this locality lens is justified
because ‘‘primary intended purposes’’ yields
more consistent classifications of products when
compared to looking at the products ‘‘as a
whole.’’
Definitional aspects of algorithm: chemical action
5. ‘‘Chemical action’’ means:
1. A chemical change in the article at the site of
treatment (locality),
2. at least one of the chemical changes belong-
ing to the article (singularity),
3. in which the chemical change leads to (i.e.
causes) the therapeutic effect (causality), and
4. the description of the interaction is consis-
tent with current Chemistry, given the con-
text of the treatment (chemicality).
6. Any change in the shape or structure of the
article or target molecule or atom need not
be permanent.
7. Ancillary or subsequent changes in molecu-
lar or atomic structure which are not the
basis upon which the therapeutic action is
achieved or that occur at some point other
than the locality shall not be relevant to
defining chemical action.
Definitional aspects of algorithm: metabolism
8. Again, we first find the primary causal chain
with respect to the primary intended purpose
that causes the intended therapeutic effect.
Then we determine whether metabolism takes
place.
9. Metabolism means any necessary molecular
modification to the article, achieved via the
biological, digestive, or respiratory processes of
the body, required for the article to achieve its
intended purposes. Metabolism occurring after
the therapeutic affect is achieved, or that is not
part of the causal chain effectuating treatment, is
not relevant to classification.
Other definitional aspects
10. The cause or risk of unintended or adverse
events is not relevant to the analysis. Those
risks are addressed by the respective regulatory
systems. Thus, if glue (a device) causes or has
the risk to cause chemical burns, that is for the
device regulatory system to identify and miti-
gate. The fact of chemical burns does not make
glue a drug.
11. Special statutory definitions override this algo-
rithm. For example, products meeting the
definition of a ‘‘biologic’’ under the PHSA,
tissue products under 21 C.F.R .1270 and 1271,
and in vitro diagnostic reagents do not go
through this algorithm.
Summary
12. Thus, to determine the classification of an
article, one first determines the most probable
chain to effectuate the therapeutic result. Next,
one assesses whether there is ‘‘chemical action’’
at the locality using the definition of chemical
action above. The ‘‘chemical action’’ must be
the primary or triggering event (cause) in the
therapeutic chain. If the article satisfies these
conditions, then it operates via chemical action.
Next, one looks to see if metabolism, as defined
above, is required for the article to achieve the
intended affect at the relevant locality.
If the article in question satisfies neither the
definition of chemical action nor the definition of
metabolism, then it may be a device.
Cases: silver nanoparticles and nanoparticle
sunscreen
To see how regulators may use this algorithm, we
will apply it to a pair of nanotechnologies already in
use: silver nanoparticles used as an anti-microbial
and zinc nanoparticles used in sunscreen. Somewhat
surprisingly, we argue that silver nanoparticles
should be classified as a drug, whereas the zinc
nanoparticles should be classified as a device. While
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these are not particularly involved nanotechnologies,
they are fairly easy to understand and display the way
in which the algorithm works. Further, neither are
metabolized, so they are particularly useful in
highlighting the analysis of chemical action we are
interested in conveying.
Silver nanoparticles are used as an anti-microbial.
Silver at the nanoscale exhibits some properties with
respect to killing bacteria that bulk silver does not.
Though the exact mechanism is not well understood
(Rai et al. 2009; Singh et al. 2008), we know that the
introduction of silver nanoparticles decreases the
survival and reproduction of bacteria that can and do
cause infections. According to the best available
hypotheses, silver nanoparticles, due to their small
size and large surface area, release silver ions easily
and in great number. These ions work on bacteria in
two ways: (1) they bond to the cell wall of bacteria
inhibiting respiration and (2) they disrupt the repro-
ductive mechanisms of the bacteria.
The primary intended purpose of the nanoparticle
silver is to act as an antimicrobial. This tells us how
to determine the therapeutic effect—they decrease or
prevent the bacteria that cause infection. Using our
locality lens, we need to look at where the silver
interacts with the body producing this therapeutic
effect. As we have seen, the silver releases silver ions
at the treatment site—the bacteria itself or the
infection site (as well as elsewhere, but we have
been clear we are only interested in changes in the
article at the site of treatment). These silver ions go to
work preventing the proliferation of and survival of
the bacteria. Now, all that remains is to determine
whether the silver is metabolized (which it is not) or
if it operates by chemical action.
The silver nanoparticles operate by chemical
action when used as an antimicrobial. The silver
undergoes a change in molecular shape. Additionally,
there is the production of silver ions (Ag? that
escapes from the weaker bonds on the large surface
small size Ag) by breaking of chemical bonds. It is
this chemical change that leads to the antimicrobial
treatment. Thus, at the site of treatment (therapeutic
effect), there is a change in the article, the silver
nanoparticle, where it is specifically this change in
the article that leads to the reduction and prevention
of bacterial infection; further, the explanation of this
interaction (including, most importantly, the change
in the silver) is well explained by our best available
chemical theories. In fact, it is the chemical proper-
ties of the sliver at the nanoscale that are our best
explanation of the antimicrobial effects of the silver.
Thus, it meets all four of our principles (and the more
rigorous algorithmic version) to be classified as a
drug—its primary mode of operation is chemical
action.
We can contrast the silver nanoparticles used as an
antimicrobial with the use of zinc nanoparticles in
sunscreen. The FDA has chosen to regulate sunscreen
as a cosmetic, which has a separate set of regulatory
rules; however, we will use it here for purely
illustrative purposes. Zinc has been a staple ingredi-
ent of sunscreen for many years now. The zinc
produces the effect of making the sunscreen look like
a white paste on the skin. By making the zinc
particles in the sunscreen nanoscale, this effect can be
greatly reduced, rendering the sunscreen nearly
transparent while, at the same time, retaining the
zinc’s light reflecting properties.
In the case of sunscreen, the nanoparticles’
primary intended purpose is the protection of the
skin from harmful light from the sun. The treatment
site is the surface of the skin. We then look at how the
article, the zinc nanoparticles, interacts with the body
to produce the effect. Sunscreen works the same way
a porous umbrella might work—it blocks a good deal
of the light from striking the skin. There is no
chemical explanation required: the sunscreen is a
purely mechanical barrier between your skin and the
sun. Further, there is no chemical change in the zinc
required to explain the sun protecting effect. Thus,
sunscreen should not be classified as a drug, as its
primary mode of action is not chemical.
Remaining issue: non-functional articles
One class of products that causes a problem for our
algorithm is the class of products that are treatment
inert. Products that produce no actual treatment defy
classification according to our algorithm. The FDA
does, and should, regulate products that merely claim
to have medical properties. Consider snake oil. Since
such a product claims to produce treatment effects,
even though it does not, it does have a ‘‘primary
intended purpose’’ that we can easily understand.
However, since it has no actual ‘‘mode of action,’’
our algorithm cannot serve to classify such a product.
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This disquieting result occurs because our algorithm
identifies articles as ‘‘chemical’’ based on whether
there is a chemical explanation of the action at the
treatment site. Where there is no action, there can be
no chemical action.
Since public safety is clearly at issue in the
statutory structure, we believe that products that are
inert with respect to treatment should still be
regulated. This problem needs to be addressed
further, but one suggestion is to simply dump this
class of objects in one of the current classifications,
whether drug, device, or combination. FDA is tasked
with regulating articles with public safety in mind, so,
in a relatively strong sense, it does not matter into
which classification inert articles fall. Current regu-
lations are intended to protect the public from
defective devices and dangerous drugs. We can see
no obvious and non-arbitrary way of assigning inert
articles to one class or another at this time.
For those interested in pursuing this question, here
is our current work to include therapeutically inert
articles in our algorithm.
Non functional articles
1. In the event that the article in question has no
actual effect, it may still be regulated based on
intended use. In such a case, consistent with case
law on intended use, the objective intent of the
manufacturer, usually evidenced by statements
from the manufacturer, will be used to determine
its ‘‘mode of action’’ for classification purposes.
This will require us to assume that a non-
efficacious or even inert article functions as the
objective intent of the manufacturer would
require if it did work.
Example 1 A company pitches a magnetic cure for
arthritis. The magnets do not in fact
produce the suggested theraputic effect.
It would be regulated as a device as, if
it worked, it would work via non-
chemical means
Example 2 A company sells a pill claiming that it
cures cancer. The pill does not do
anything. This would be regulated as a
drug because, if it worked, it would
have worked chemically
Conclusion
New technologies often present challenges to statu-
tory schemes developed years ago (and usually by
non-scientists). Nanotechnology poses just such a
challenge to FDA. Nano products used for therapeu-
tic purposes must be correctly classified as drugs or
devices in order to effectuate the statutory purpose.
Further, a good deal of money and time can be at
stake in the classification. The classification differ-
ence relies on drugs operating ‘‘chemically’’ and
devices operating physically or mechanically. Within
the nano world, however, chemistry and physics blur.
The concepts we set forth in this paper and the
more detailed algorithm we provide are intended to
resolve this legal and scientific dilemma. The four
pillars of chemicality, singularity, causality, and
locality serve as the basis for differentiating chem-
istry and physics, at least for the purposes of this
regulatory framework. As implemented in the
detailed algorithm, this proposal answers the mode
of action question in a way that satisfies the statutory
purpose, meets basic scientific knowledge, and,
perhaps most importantly, provides appropriate pro-
tection to public health.
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